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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________ 
 
No. 11-3108 
_________ 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MIRSAD KOLASINAC, 
also known as MIKI, 
 
Mirsad Kolasinac, 
                            Appellant 
 
________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-09-cr-00307-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jose L. Linares 
 
 _______ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 18, 2012 
 
Before: SLOVITER, RENDELL, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 20, 2012) 
 
______ 
 
OPINION 
______ 
2 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 Mirsad Kolasinac appeals his 262 month sentence for possession with intent to 
distribute methamphetamine.  He argues that the District Court committed procedural 
error by not properly considering his arguments for granting a variance from the 
guideline range.  We will affirm.
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I. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives conducted a joint investigation 
into Balkan criminal enterprises.  The investigation used undercover officers to infiltrate 
criminal activities, particularly the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and other contraband.  
Mirsad Kolasinac is a naturalized United States citizen originally from Serbia.  At 
the time of his arrest, he worked as the superintendent of an apartment building and 
operated a coffee shop in New Jersey.  Kolasinac met two undercover agents during the 
investigation.  At one meeting in June 2008, Kolasinac gave one of the undercover agents 
a gun and offered to assist in any type of “violent act” the recipient needed to have done.  
Pre-Sentence Report at 7.  In July of the same year, Kolasinac and his cohort, Rasim 
Corhamzic, sold 5,100 pills of ecstasy to an undercover agent for $21,480.  At the same 
meeting, Kolasinac paid the undercover agent $2,500 for contraband cigarettes.  In 
August 2008, Kolasinac and Corhamzic again sold the undercover agent what they 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This court has 
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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believed was ecstasy and Oxycontin for $65,620.  Subsequent chemical analysis showed 
that some of the purported ecstasy pills in fact contained methamphetamine 
hydrochloride.  Corhamzic had smuggled the drugs into the United States from Canada 
by noncommercial airplane.   
 Kolasinac was indicted on five counts: (1) from January 2008 through March 14, 
2009, conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute controlled 
substances including methamphetamine and ecstasy; (2) from January 2008 through 
March 14, 2009, conspiracy to import controlled substances including methamphetamine 
and ecstasy from Canada to New Jersey; (3) possession with intent to distribute 
methamphetamine on July 14, 2008; (4) possession with intent to distribute 
methamphetamine from August 18-19, 2008; and (5) possession with intent to distribute 
ecstasy on July 14, 2008.  Kolasinac entered into a plea agreement and pled guilty to 
Count Four of the indictment.   
 Kolasinac’s base offense level was determined to be 38.  Three separate two-level 
enhancements were applied for possessing a firearm during the offense, unlawfully 
importing a controlled substance on a noncommercial aircraft, and importing 
methamphetamine.  A three-level reduction was granted for acceptance of responsibility 
resulting in a total offense level of 41.    
 Kolasinac sought a variance based on his ignorance that the drugs were 
methamphetamine, his self-proclaimed minor role in the conspiracy, and the 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a) factors.  The District Court denied his requests.  It first noted that the non-
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mandatory guideline range was properly calculated.  It then stated that Kolasinac’s 
offense was very serious and required deterrence regardless of his ignorance about the 
product.  The District Court also noted that the nature and quantity of drugs and the 
nature and extent of the conspiracy required a serious sentence.  It further stated that 
Kolasinac played more than a minor role in the transaction and conspiracy.  While 
accepting that some of Kolasinac’s statements at sentencing mitigated towards a sentence 
at the bottom of the range, the District Court ultimately declared that the facts of the case 
did not warrant a variance below the mandatory minimum. 
 The District Court subsequently sentenced Kolasinac to 324 months 
imprisonment, on the low end of his guideline range.  However, after the two-level 
increase for importation of methamphetamine was found inapplicable, resulting in a 
lower guideline range of 262-327 months, Kolasinac’s sentence was reduced to 262 
months.  Kolasinac appeals, claiming that the District Court committed procedural error 
by, inter alia, not meaningfully considering his request for a downward variance from the 
mandatory minimum based on his belief that some of the drugs were ecstasy rather than 
methamphetamine. 
II. 
 We review the reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.  
See United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010).  This is a two stage 
process.  See id.  First, we determine whether the district court committed any significant 
procedural error.  See id.  If the district court’s procedures are sound, we next examine 
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the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.  See id.  We will affirm unless no 
reasonable sentencing court would impose the same sentence for the reasons provided by 
the district court.  See id.   
 Procedural error occurs when the district court fails to calculate (or improperly 
calculates) the guideline range, treats the guideline range as mandatory, fails to consider 
the § 3553(a) factors, chooses a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails to 
adequately explain the sentence.  See id.  When determining a sentence, the record need 
only reflect that the district court meaningfully considered the § 3553(a) factors and any 
other arguably meritorious arguments raised by the defendant.  See United States v. 
Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Kimbrough v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
 Section 3553(a) provides that when determining a sentence the court should 
consider: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed; (3) the kinds of 
sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established; (5) 
pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentence disparities between similar defendants; and (7) the need to provide 
restitution to victims of the offense.  18 U.S.C § 3553(a).  We have stated that meaningful 
consideration does not require a discussion and findings on each factor as long as it is 
clear that the relevant factors were taken into account.  See Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329.   
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Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that when a matter is conceptually simple and the 
record makes clear the sentencing judge considered the evidence and arguments, a brief 
explanation of the reasons for the sentence is all the law requires.  See Rita v. United 
States, 551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007).     
 In the case before us, the District Court’s reasoning is sufficient to show that it 
meaningfully considered all relevant factors as well as the nonfrivolous arguments made 
by defendant before sentencing.  Kolasinac’s primary contention on appeal is that his 
ignorance that the drugs were methamphetamine should have resulted in a downward 
variance.  The District Court rejected this argument, noting that there was no basis to rule 
that the defendant’s ignorance should negate the fact that the pills turned out to contain 
methamphetamines, rather than ecstasy, and that methamphetamines are extremely 
dangerous to the public.   
 The District Court also rejected Kolasinac’s argument that he played only a minor 
role in the conspiracy.  It stated that in light of Kolasinac’s participation in the 
transaction, his help negotiating, his knowledge of the transaction and smuggling 
operation, and the use of a non-commercial airplane to smuggle drugs, his participation 
was not minor.  The District Court did recognize that some of Kolasinac’s statements at 
the sentencing hearing warranted a sentence on the lower end of the guideline range but  
ultimately found that the facts of the case did not warrant a sentence below the guideline 
range.  Although the District Court’s discussion of Kolasinac’s arguments was brief, it 
clearly considered those arguments. 
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III. 
 Because the District Court did not commit procedural error when it sentenced 
Kolasinac, we will affirm the judgment of sentence.  
